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Abstract
We describe a new coordination mechanism for non-atomic congestion games that leads to a (selfish) social cost which is
arbitrarily close to the non-selfish optimal. This mechanism incurs no additional cost, in contrast to tolls that typically
differ from the social cost as expressed in terms of delays.
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1. Introduction
Selfish behavior is one of the primary reasons many
systems with multiple agents deviate from desirable out-
comes. Allowing players to prioritize solely their own ben-
efit can lead to social inefficiency, even in outcomes where
no one is better off compared to an optimal solution.
This type of behavior has been analyzed in various con-
texts and has often been verified in practice. A key such
area is transportation and network routing where selfish
selection among possible routes can lead to congestion with
accompanying economical and environmental issues.
Various approaches have been proposed to steer the
selfishly constructed outcome towards optimal social wel-
fare. The main idea is usually to incentivize the users
to alter their selections to ones that lead to socially bet-
ter outcomes, typically through the use of tolls or similar
measures.
We propose an alternative approach that alters the way
users experience latency and can offer significant improve-
ments on social cost, however drivers still get to pick their
own route In more detail, instead of all users experiencing
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the same latency, we propose to implement variable laten-
cies through a prioritization scheme. That is, we allow
for some users to experience smaller latencies than before,
while others to experience longer ones. We employ known
results to show that our system, if users behave selfishly
as expected, achieves the optimal social welfare. To make
such a system practical we present a discretization of the
theoretical continuous functions that approximates the op-
timal social welfare.
We also wish to emphasize the distributed and decen-
tralized nature of our system. As explained in the next sec-
tions, each resource (road or highway in the transportation
setting) implements the desired changes individually and
independently. It is important to note that our system’s
average latency on each road, as experienced by the users,
is at least equal, and actually closely matches, the road’s
average latency without the system in place, hence our sys-
tem falls under the notion of coordination mechanisms, i.e.
no “cheating” in the form of network improvements, which
typically carry significant cost, is introduced. Also, there
is no imposing of tolls (transfer of social cost to a different
type); we simply distribute the resource differently. This
holds on any instance, not just in equilibrium settings,
which means that even in non-stable situations we do not
get worse performance. Furthermore, we do not need to
know the demand in advance, i.e. our system delivers close
to the social optimum for all possible total amounts of traf-
fic. Our only requirement is that the latency induced on
each road is a non-negative, non-decreasing, continuously
differentiable and convex function of the traffic.
We believe that our system has a strong applicabil-
ity potential. For example, some countries have already
implemented metered highway entrance ramps which can
vary the latency of incoming drivers. Traffic lights may
also be used in an urban environment to implement this
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aspect of our mechanism. We deliberately leave the pri-
oritization scheme generic to allow for different such ap-
proaches with our only requirement being that users choos-
ing to alter their current selection are forced to experience
maximal latency in their new selection, a reasonable re-
quirement as typically someone that alters her selection in
a running system ends up at the end of the queue.
We examine our system in the generic scheme of con-
gestion games, to emphasize that it admits applications
beyond traffic routing. One interesting application could
be in the context of job scheduling on computing resources.
Again, in a typical model, each user choosing to use a par-
ticular resource experiences the same latency, for example
computing jobs running in parallel on a computer. By pri-
oritizing jobs according to our proposed mechanism, such
that some jobs complete faster and some slower than be-
fore, we can achieve optimal average job completion times
under selfish behavior. We note that this can easily be im-
plemented by an administrator (human or computerized)
using system priorities.
2. Related work
The fact that selfish behavior can lead to inefficiency
has long been studied in the context of transportation the-
ory [1, 2]. More recently, Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou
introduced the Price of Anarchy as a measure of this inef-
ficiency [3, 4]. Exploration of this metric in the context of
selfish routing was then greatly progressed by Roughgar-
den and Tardos [5, 6] who bounded the price of anarchy
for different classes of latency functions.
Naturally, ways to improve inefficient outcomes have
been investigated, with a prime example being the im-
posement of tolls [7, 8, 9]. While this approach achieves
optimal social welfare regarding latencies, it introduces a
cost separation to the players as the tolls’ cost is affecting
behavior but is not accounted for in the objective function.
Coordination mechanisms have recently been introduced
by Christodoulou et al. [10] as a way to “shape” latency
functions to steer the selfishly dictated outcome towards
greater social welfare. There are two main restrictions
in the type of coordination mechanisms defined in [10],
namely that the latency per resource is not decreased and
that the benchmark optimal social welfare, against which
the mechanism is measured, is still the original one without
any additional latencies possibly imposed by the mecha-
nism. It has recently been shown that indeed such mech-
anisms can positively affect social welfare [11]. Our ap-
proach sustains the non-decreasing latency on average but
not on every user, as a prerequisite for achieving, through
‘coordination’, a significantly lower price of anarchy than
the mechanism of [10]. In fact, the average latency per
user within our system can be made arbitrarily close to
the unique latency per user without the system in place.
The approach of differentiating the latency per resource
is also explored from an algorithmic perspective by Harks
et al. [12] but not with the same scheme. The results
of Farzad et al. [13] are closer to our work. However, in
the later, it is the strategic equilibrium without the mech-
anism of [13] in place that matches the optimal under
that mechanism; i.e., the strategic equilibrium under that
mechanism may in general differ substantially from the
non-selfish optimal.
3. Model
We define a congestion game (E, l,S, P, d) in the generic
sense but using network routing (or alternatively, flow) ter-
minology for convenience. First, a set E of edges with an
associated non-negative, non-decreasing, continuously dif-
ferentiable and convex le() latency function for each edge.
We note that these assumptions are typical for latency
functions.
In P , we have n player types 1, 2, . . . , n. For each player
type i we have a source-sink pair (si, ti). We also have a
finite set Si of finite sequences of elements of E, called the
strategy set of player type i. A particular element S ∈ Si
is a single strategy of player type i, also referred to as
a path from si to ti. Finally, we have a flow (or traffic)
demand di for each player type i.
We assume that each player type corresponds to a con-
tinuum of nonatomic players, each with negligible flow, i.e.
they can be arbitrarily divided into the various paths. An
infinitesimal part of the flow or traffic will often referred to
as a user. Let xSi denote a nonnegative real representing
the part of demand corresponding to player type i that
uses strategy (path) S and xi the vector for the strategy
set Si, i.e. xi = (x
S
i )S∈Si . The vector x for all xi’s is called
a flow if for all player types i,
∑
S∈Si
xSi = di. We define
the part of the demand of a player type i that uses edge e
as
xie =
∑
{S:S∈Si,e∈S}
xSi ,
and the total flow through an edge e as
xe =
∑
i=1...n
xie.
In related literature, the cost induced to each player type
i by a flow x is defined to be ci(x) =
∑
e∈E le(xe) ·x
i
e. The
cost of the total flow through an edge e is defined to be
ce(xe) = le(xe) · xe,
whereas the social cost is defined to be
C(x) =
∑
e∈E
le(xe) · xe.
For reference, we now give the notion of Wardrop equilib-
rium in our setting.
Definition 1. We say that the flow vector x is in Wardrop
equilibrium if for all player types i and for any pairs of
strategies (paths) S1, S2 ∈ Si, if x
S1
i > 0 then the follow-
ing holds: ∑
e∈S1
le(xe) ≤
∑
e∈S2
le(xe). (1)
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4. Variable delay mechanism
Given a congestion game (E, l,S, d) with non-negative,
non-decreasing, continuously differentiable and convex la-
tency functions, we propose a coordination mechanism
which differentiates the latency experienced by different
users as follows:
Let N = (Ne)e∈E be a sequence of positive integers
indexed by the set of elements (edges) E to be called a
batch system. A positive integer b ≤ Ne is referred to as a
batch index (or just batch) at edge e. At each edge e, the
total flow xe through e is split into Ne batches of equal size
xe/Ne each. Each batch induces a different latency cost
to its corresponding flow, with batches of a larger index
getting larger latencies, as formally defined below. Note
that this means that different parts of the flow of some
player type could receive different latencies. The way that
this split is implemented does not affect our results, i.e.,
the assignment of flow to batches can be performed by any
desired policy (e.g., randomly or first-come-first-served or
through priority lists).
Now consider the following functions, known as marginal–
cost latency functions:
lˆe(xe) = c
′
e(xe) = le(xe) + l
′
e(xe) · xe, (2)
where c′e(), l
′
e() are the derivatives of ce(), le(), respec-
tively. The latency induced is not going to be equal among
users at an edge e. Instead, the flow of any player type and
through any path S at batch b receives latency lˆe((b/Ne)xe)
per unit. Users are interested in minimizing their own la-
tency. We refer to the model of applying equal latency to
all users as the uniform latency or classical model.
Since each batch b receives latency lˆe((b/Ne)xe) per
unit, we define the cost with respect to the batch system
at an edge with flow xe to be:
cˆe(xe) = (xe/Ne)
Ne∑
b=1
lˆe((b/Ne)xe)
and the social cost with respect to the batch system
Cˆ(x) =
∑
e
cˆe(xe).
Note that cˆe(xe) ≥
∫ xe
0
lˆe(z)dz = le(xe)xe = ce(xe), there-
fore we do not decrease the cost as per the coordination
mechanisms’ doctrine and as we shall see later, any cost
increase can be made arbitrarily small.
Although we state above that all batches of the flow
at a particular edge are of equal size xe/Ne, let us note
that this is not essential for our proofs, i.e., all technical
arguments go through for arbitrary batch sizes. We as-
sume batches of equal size to avoid cumbersome notation
and thus improve clarity. In addition, when the number
of batches tends to infinity, all batch sizes approach zero;
that asymptotic case is important because, then, the Price
of Anarchy under our model approaches 1 while the cost
approaches the cost under the uniform latency model.
Given a path S, a sequence of batch indices be, e ∈ S
is called a batch assignment for S.
Definition 2. We say that the flow vector x is in equilib-
rium with respect to the batch system if for all player types
s i and for any pairs of strategies (paths) S1, S2 ∈ Si, if
xS1i > 0, then for every batch assignment be, e ∈ S1, the
following holds:
∑
e∈S1
lˆe((be/Ne)xe) ≤
∑
e∈S2
lˆe(xe). (3)
Intuitively, if a user (infinitesimal part of flow) changes
path, then we assume that it gets to the last batch of ev-
ery edge of the new path. Indeed this is so because in the
right hand side of the above equation the cost of the last
batch appears for all edges; whereas on the left we have the
cost of an arbitrary batch sequence be along S1. What the
above equation expresses is that under this assumption,
there is no strict gain in cost a user experiences if it uni-
laterally implements a change of path (users are assumed
to be anonymous, so the batch at an edge for a particular
user is not well defined; this is the reason arbitrary batch
sequences within the various edges of a path are taken on
the left side).
We now have the following:
Lemma 3. The flow vector x is in equilibrium with re-
spect to the batch system iff it is in Wardrop equilibrium
with respect to the marginal–cost latency functions lˆe(xe) =
le(xe) + l
′
e(xe) · xe, i.e. iff for all players i and for any
pairs of strategies (paths) S1, S2 ∈ Si, if x
S1
i > 0, then∑
e∈S1
lˆe(xe) ≤
∑
e∈S2
lˆe(xe).
Proof. For the sufficiency of Wardrop equilibrium with
respect to the marginal-cost latency notice that since le()
are convex, lˆe are non-decreasing. For the necessity notice
that because the inequality in Definition 2 holds for any
selection of batch indices, and therefore also for be = Ne.

We now state the following well known theorems derived
from the literature [14, 6].
Theorem 4. When the latencies are non-negative, con-
tinuous and non–decreasing, there always exists at least
one Wardrop equilibrium.
Theorem 5. If x and x′ are flow vectors in Wardrop equi-
librium then le(xe)xe = le(x
′
e)x
′
e for all edges e. This also
shows a unique social cost for all Wardrop equilibria.
Theorem 6. A flow vector x in Wardrop equilibrium with
respect to the marginal–cost latencies le(xe) + l
′
e(xe) · xe
has optimal social cost C(x) with respect to the latency
functions le.
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Figure 1: An example on Pigou’s network
We will now transfer these results in our variable delay
batch setting.
Theorem 7. Under the variable delay mechanism, any
batch system has a unique equilibrium (as defined in Def-
inition 2). Moreover, there is always a suitable batch sys-
tem whose cost, with respect to the batch system, when
in equilibrium (in the sense of Definition 2), is arbitrar-
ily close to its optimal social cost of the uniform latency
model.
Proof. Indeed by the preceding Theorems 4–6, and by
Lemma 3, it suffices to prove that if a flow x is in equilib-
rium with respect to a suitable batch system, then its cost
Cˆ(x) with respect to the batch system is arbitrarily close
to the social cost C(x) of the uniform latency model with
respect to latencies le. This however is immediate to see
since
cˆe(xe) = (xe/Ne)
Ne∑
b=1
lˆe((b/Ne)xe)
can be made arbitrarily close to∫ xe
0
lˆe(z)dz = le(xe)xe = ce(xe)
by choosing for each e a large enoughNe. Note that at this
point one needs an upper bound of the demand to pick a
large enough Ne but this is not required if the approxima-
bility bound is not needed. 
5. Discussion
Interestingly, even a small number of batches can offer
significant improvements in certain situations. We illus-
trate the classic Pigou’s network as an example with a
total traffic of 1. In the original network (see Figure 1a),
it is well known that the Price of Anarchy is 4/3 since
all users would pick the lower edge inducing latency of 1
to everyone while the optimal solution would be for the
users to be split evenly among the edges with an average
latency of 3/4. By using 3 batches with variable delays
(Figure 1b), in equilibrium, half of the traffic would pick
the lower edge and be distributed uniformly among the 3
batches with an induced latency of 1/3, 2/3 and 1 respec-
tively. The average latency would be
0.5 · 1 + 0.5 · 1/3 · (1/3 + 2/3 + 1) = 5/6.
The resulting Price of Anarchy compared to the optimal
solution in the original network would be 10/9, a signifi-
cant improvement from 4/3. Even with just two batches,
the resulting Price of Anarchy would be 7/6
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